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The Supreme Court's decisions under section 1983 1 continue to generate confusion
and uncertainty. 2 Particularly troublesome for the Court has been the question of entity
liability' for violations of federal rights. States cannot be sued for damages, at least in
federal court, thanks to the shield provided by the eleventh amendment.'' Taken literally,
section 1983's impositi6n of liability upon "every person" could easily be read to include
states..In Quern v. jordan, 5 however, the Court ruled the other way, settling the matter
at least for now.
But what of municipalities against whom a cause of action is asserted under section
I983?6 According to Monroe v. Pape,' municipalities were not persons either and thus,
(Copyright © Boston College Law School.
*Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. A.B. 1961, Harvard; LL.B. 1965, Harvard Law
School.
' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
2 E.g., Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
482, 482-83 (1982).
As used in this article the term entity liability involves the ability of a plaintiff to sue a
governmental unit such as a municipality for damages, as opposed to suing individual officials or
employees.
4 E.g., Brown, State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court — How the Eleventh Amendment Survived
the Death of the Tenth: Some Broader Implications of Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 74 GEO. L.J.
363, 363-64 (1985).
5 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
6 Section 1983 is not jurisdictional. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 526 (1978) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). Although not providing the underlying substantive rights and duties, it is a com-
ponent of the plaintiff's cause of action, perhaps most accurately described as a right of action.
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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were also immune from section 1983 liability. Yet the Court chose to overrule this aspect
of Monroe seventeen years later. It might have gone to the opposite extreme and invoked
the well-established doctrine of respondeat superior to determine municipal liability. In-
stead, in 1978, in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 8 the Court sought to establish a
middle ground between these two rules: municipalities are liable for acts of their em-
ployees only when the acts involve "official policy." At a doctrinal level, the concept of
official policy may well make sense, but in operation it is a quicksand of uncertainty. The
Court has recently attempted to give it content in Pembaur v. City of Cintinnati, 10 finding
a municipality liable, and in City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle," finding a municipality not
liable. Each case was decided by a plurality, with various justices concurring and dis-
senting. The entire edifice of municipal liability is a creation of the Burger Court."
Official policy is its cornerstone. Yet it is not an exaggeration to say that no one knows
what "official policy" is.
Of course, deep divisions within the Court are hardly unique and are not limited to
section 1983 cases. Government by judiciary may have become government by plurality."
Yet section 1983 does seem to pose its own peculiar problems. An initial question relates
to the sources of law: can the extensive body of cases applying a broadly worded 1871
statute really be characterized — and justified — as statutory construction?" It seems
inevitable that the Court will act as a common law tribunal, weighing and utilizing
competing notions of public policy. What makes the conflict over section 1983 particularly
sharp is that the cases arise in the broader context of federalism debates. The section
1983 plaintiff is invoking federal authority (usually a federal tribunal as well as federal
law) to oversee and correct actions of his or her state or local government. Indeed, the
statute has become perhaps the major focal point of Burger Court federalism conflicts. 15
To say that the Court is fundamentally divided over the nature and role of the
American federal system is to understate the obvious. Two opposing visions compete,
each winning out some of the time. First, what might be called the federalistic vision
emphasizes the prerogatives of states (and local governments as well). States are seen as
somewhat sovereign, somewhat autonomous, and they merit comity at the hands of the
national government. Cases such as National League of Cities v. Usery, 18 the Younger "ab-
8 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
9 Id. at 694.
'° 106 S. Ct. 1292 (1986).
" 105 S. Ct. 2427 (1985).
12 The principal cases involving municipal liability are Pembaur, 106 S. Ct. 1292; Tidily, 105 S.
Ct. 2427; City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981); Owen v. City of Independence.
445 U.S. 622 (1980); Monell, 436 U.S. 658 (Monell overruled that part of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961), which held that municipalities were not persons).
Cf. Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1127 (1981).
m See, Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 487.
' 5 Developments in the Law, Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1135 (1977)
[hereinafter Developments].
The elevation and appointment of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia were confirmed
by the Senate as this article was coming to publication. The article centers on the treatment of
section 1983 entity liability by the Burger Court. While it is impossible to know whether section
1983 will remain a focal point in the Court's federalism conflicts, it seems likely that such conflicts
will continue with Justice Scalia replacing Chief Justice Burger in the federalistic camp. See infra
text accompanying notes 16-21.
'" 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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stention" decisions," and those giving new life to the eleventh amendment's epitomize
this view of federalism as a guiding force in placing limits on both Congress and the
judiciary. In the 1970's, many scholars saw this deferential federalism as a hallmark of
the Burger Court, and a disturbing one at that's
Any reports of federalism's triumph were, however, exceedingly premature. In 1985,
the Court overruled National League of Cities in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority 20 Garcia not only re-establishes the primacy of Congress in national-state con-
flicts; it also emphasizes the tenuous nature of the 5 to 4 decisions in which the federalistic
vision has prevailed. Garcia reflects the second and what might be called the nationalist
vision of the Court. This vision is anchored in the supremacy clause and the fourteenth
amendment. It has particular implications for the federal judiciary; when federally
created rights are at stake, concern for the states should not block their assertion. The
federal courts are seen as the "primary and powerfurs' forum for the vindication of
federal rights. The extreme dichotomy between the federalistic and nationalist visions
prevents a coherent view of the federal system from commanding a consistent majority
of the Court.
As in other related fields," the Court's inability to reach a consensus on the nature
of the American federal system results in ambiguous section 1983 decisions. Federalistic
concerns have frequently operated to bar access to the federal courts for section 1983
plaintiffs. The decisions reflecting these concerns led, at one time, to dire predictions of
"evisceration" of the statute." Yet once in court, plaintiffs have encountered a frequently
hospitable reception. The Court has held municipalities to be "persons" liable in section
1983 suits24 and has denied municipalities the ability to assert a good faith immunity
defense.'s Further, the Court has found official policy, thus rendering the municipality
liable, in a single act by a high level official.'s To be sure, the record is mixed. Punitive
damages cannot be assesed against municipalities?' and official policy may not be
found.ss When it comes to suits against individuals, the plaintiff will confront an array
of immunity defenses.ss Even here, however, the cases are not an unmixed string of pro-
defendant rulings.ss Ambiguity, rather than evisceration, has been the order of the day.
" E.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Huffman v.
Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See generally C. WRIGHT,
LAW or FEDERAL Cowers, 320-30 (4th ed. 1983).
18 E.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985); Pennhurst State School &
Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst II), 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability of -Judicial Review,
86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977); Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1191 (1977).
20 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,464 (1974) (emphasis deleted) (quoting F. FRANKFURTER
& ). LANDIS, THE. BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 65 (1928)).
22 See, e.g., Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term — Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger
Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982).
23 E.g., Juidice, 430 U.S. at 346 (Brennan. J., dissenting); Developments, supra note 15, at 1175.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
26 Owen, 445 U.S. at 650.
20 Pembaur, 106 S. Ct. at 1293.
27 Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 271.
20 Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. at 2435-36.
22 The defendant may claim either absolute immunity or qualified immunity. For a discussion
of the two, see, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 106 S. Ct. 1092,1095-99 (1986).
90 Compare Malley, 106 S. Ct. at 1097 (police officer seeking complaint entitled to qualified
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This article examines that ambiguity as it is manifested in both the general area of
section 1983 municipal liability and in the specific context of the Tuttle and Pembaur
decisions, the Court's two attempts to develop the concept of official policy. That concept
was born as a seeming mid-point between either holding municipalities absolutely im-
mune from or vicariously liable under section 1983. Like any compromise, it is prone to
attempts to make it mean all things to all people. Thus, the cases discussed here show
virtual unanimity within the Court on official policy as the relevant inquiry. This agree-
ment, however, is coupled with sharply divergent approaches on how to answer the
inquiry. Federalistic and nationalist interpretations of the concept vie for a majority. The
analysis offered in this article suggests that neither side is likely to• prevail, although a
tilt towards the federalistic view is probable. As a result, continued ambiguity can be
expected in the section 1983 entity liability context.
I. THE MUNICIPAL LIABILITY OPTIONS — ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY,
OR SOMETHING IN BETWEEN
A. A Note on Section 1983 Methodology
Before analyzing the three options available to the Court and its treatment of them,
some consideration of the sources of law problem mentioned above seems appropriate.
Does the Court exercise a relatively free hand in developing a "law" of section 1983, or
is its course guided and constricted by rules of statutory construction? The Court fre-
quently insists that the latter situation pertains. Thus, the opening ritual may include a
statement that what is involved is "essentially [a matter] of statutory construction." 31
At times the statutory language does provide at least some guidance. In Polk County
v. Dodson, 32 for example, the Court concluded that section 1983 was not applicable
because "under color of law" was not a term which extended to the activities of a county-
funded public defender." Similarly, in deciding that a municipality could not be liable
under theories of respondeat superior, the Court emphasized the statute's utilization of the
words "subjects, or causes to be subjected" as requiring a direct involvement by the
municipality rather than permitting liability on any vicarious basis!"
The Court has remained within the statutory context by also relying heavily on the
purposes of the 1871 Reconstruction Congress in decisions which emphasize the impor-
tance of compensation for victims of official wrongdoing and deterrence of such conduct
in the future." Finally, insofar as the traditional tools of statutory construction play a
role, the Court frequently refers to the legislative history, particularly to Congress's
rejection in 1871 of the so-called Sherman amendment, which would have made munic-
ipalities liable for injuries inflicted by private persons. 36
immunity only) with Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325,335-36 (1983) (police officer testifying at trial
entitled to absolute immunity).
'' Owen, 445 U.S. at 635.
17 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
" Id. at 325.
14 Monett, 436 U.S. at 694; see infra text accompanying notes 85-87.
" E.g., Owen, 445 U.S. at 650-51.
" E.g., Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. at 2433 ("The principal objections to the Sherman amendment voiced
in the 42d Congress were that the section appeared to impose a federal obligation to keep the peace
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Realistically, however, the broad — some have said vague" —language of the statute
answers few questions. Nor does the history of what Congress rejected in 1871 reveal
much about what it enacted. Even in those section 1983 cases purportedly grounded in
statutory construction, a substantial discussion of current public policy considerations is
the norm.
Another technique which permits the Court to cling to the notion that a process of
statutory interpretation is involved is recourse to the legal climate in which section 1983
was enacted." The theory here is that Congress was aware of current common law
doctrines and intended the statute to be applied in accordance with these doctrines. This
justification for linking section 1983 to the common law has had its most extensive
utilization with respect to the assertion of individual immunity defenses, both qualified
and absolute.'" There is no reference to immunity on the face of the statute and little
guidance from the legislative history. Still, the Court has insisted that Congress would
not have wished to discard such well-established 19th-century immunities as those ac-
corded to judges and legislators. The use of the legal climate approach, however, does
not stop there. At times the Court seems to be saying, in the immunity context, that the
1871 Congress intended to incorporate common law methodology. Thus the classic com-
mon law technique of analogizing current problems to those of other times permits
decisions which rest substantially on considerations of public policy."
Realistically, a good deal more than statutory construction is involved. The Court
itself has admitted that section 1983 "is not to be taken literally." 4 ' The section 1983
cases generally, not just those dealing with immunity, might be viewed as a body of
federal common law analogous to that body of law permitting suits against federal
officials for constitutional violations which the Court has developed in the Bivens con-
text.42 Indeed, the two lines of cases draw upon each other." In Butz v. Economou," a
Blum case dealing with a range of immunity issues, the Court made plain the common
law nature of the section 1983 immunity decisions. It described them as representing
what the Court "deemed to be the appropriate type of immunity" 45 and justified their
use as guiding precedent in the Bivens context by eschewing any "undue emphasis" on
the congressional source of the section 1983 cause of action." The Bivens cases use the
section 1983 precedents not out of historical compulsion but because the Court thinks
they represent sound policy.
' 7 Developments, supra note 15, at 1156.
38 Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 336-41.
39 See cases cited supra notes 29-30.
40 The best examples of this technique are Bivens cases such as Cleavinger v. Saxner, 106 S. Ct.
496, 500-04 (1985) (prison disciplinary board receives only qualified immunity), and Butz, 438 U.S.
at 508-14 (absolute immunity for administrative hearing examiners). The Bivens cases and those
under section 1983 use similar methodologies in this respect. See infra text accompanying notes 41—
46. For a section 1983 case which uses common law techniques to blend historical analysis with
current notions of public policy, see Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 329-46.
'' Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 330.
42 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
E.g., Cleavingei, 106 S. Ct. at 501 (a Etyma case citing Briscoe, which is a section 1983 case).
" 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
45 Id. at 503.
1" Id. at 503-04, 511.
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The similarity between the Court's development of section 1983 law and Bivens-style
federill common law 47 may be part of a broader phenomenon. Recent scholarship has
explored the close relationship among statutory interpretation, constitutional adjudica-
tion, and federal common law. 48 In this respect, it is possible to analogize the section
1983 cause of action to the jurisdictional statute at issue in the Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills case. 48 In both instances Congress has given the judiciary a relatively free
hand in the enforcement of federally created rights.
Thus, in the context of municipal liability under section 1983, the statute does
provide some guidance and support with respect to the Court's rejection of the two polar
options — municipal liability under respondeat superior theory or municipal immunity
from liability — and its establishment of the middle ground, official policy concept. That
the term "official policy" does not even appear in the statute, however, shows that the
Court is acting in a common law manner as well as engaging in statutory construction
narrowly defined. With respect to the unanswered questions about the meaning of official
policy, the Court is largely on its own.
B. One End of the Spectrum: Municipal Immunity Reconsidered
One might have expected a federalistic Court to accord cities total immunity, putting
them on a par with states. That was the pre-Burger Court interpretation of section 1983
established in 1961 by Monroe. The Monroe Court relied on the 1871 Congress's rejection
of the so-called Sherman amendment as justification for a holding that municipalities
were exempt from any liability. 8° The amendment as reported out of conference com-
mittee would have made municipalities and similar levels of government liable for certain
lawless acts committed within their borders whether they had any control over, or
knowledge of, these acts. The 1871 Congress rejected this approach decisively. The
Court drew the conclusion that what was at work was not only an intense opposition to
the Sherman amendment but also a broader aversion to municipal liability of any kind.
Thus, paradoxically, the case regarded as the fountainhead of current section 1983
litigation81 did not open the flood gates at all on one of the fundamental issues in most
1983 suits: whether the municipal entity can itself be liable.
Monroe's treatment of the issue might be criticized as cursory. Seventeen years later,
in Monell, the Court reconsidered the issue and found that Monroe was wrong and should
be overruled, 82 The primary reason for this fresh look was the existence of a number
of cases in which the Court appeared to have proceeded upon the assumption that
municipalities could be sued directly under section 1983. 83
Justice Brennan's opinion for the seven justice majority in Monell returned to the
rejection of the Sherman amendment and focused on what precisely can be gleaned
44 See Mum, From Monroe to Monell: Defining the Scope of Municipal Liability in Federal Courts, 51
TEMP. L.Q. 409,416-19 (1978); Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 486.
48 E.g., Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 883 (1986);
Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 (1985).,.
19 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
3° Monroe, 365 U.S. at 188-92.
5 ' See, e.g., Developments, supra note 15, at 1137,1169-72.
" Monell, 436 U.S. at 663.
" Id. at 695-96; id. at 710-11 (Powell, J., concurring).
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from this refusal to adopt a measure of such draconian proportions." Justice Brennan
argued somewhat convincingly that the amendment was aimed at something quite dif-
ferent than holding a municipality liable for the acts of its own officials''
That rejection of the Sherman amendment did not foreclose the broader issue of
municipal liability only answered part of the problem posed, however, in the Monroe-
Monell situation, in which plaintiffs attempt to proceed directly against the municipality.
In addition it was necessary for Justice Brennan to demonstrate affirmatively that mu-
nicipalities were included within the statute's reference to "any person." For Justice
Brennan, this question could be answered "unequivocally."" This conclusion has a three-
fold basis. First, it was generally agreed that the statute was remedial and to be broadly
construed. 57 Second, there was one reference in the 1871 debate to suits against cities,
which Justice Brennan interpreted as demonstrating that Congress understood that such
suits would lie if the bill were enacted.'" Finally, he relied on relevant language in the
contemporary "Dictionary Act" to the effect that "the word person may extend and be
applied to bodies politic and corporate ... unless the context shows that such words
were intended to be used in a more limited sense." 59
This broad exercise in statutory construction is certainly open to question even if
one accepts the Court's views on the implications of the rejection of the Sherman
amendments° Indeed, Justice Rehnquist raised several difficult points in his dissent,
including the obvious weakness of the Dictionary Act's use of the word "may" and the
fact that contexts could vary the meaning of the word "person." Nonetheless, Justice
Brennan is probably on sound ground given the admittedly broad remedial purpose of
section 1983. The word "person" will certainly bear a meaning which includes municipal
corporations. Given the enacting Congress's intent to reach the acts of governmental
units, the result in Monell may well be the correct one as long as the issue can be viewed
as not implicating any constitutional obstacles.
There is, however, a constitutional provision which cannot be ignored when ad-
dressing the fundamental issue of whether a municipal entity can be liable. That pro-
vision is the eleventh amendment, which the Court has broadly construed to prohibit
federal question suits against stales by their own citizens in federal courts. 62 Yet the
treatment of the amendment in Monell suggests that the issue hardly merits discussion.
Justice Brennan relegated it to a footnote in which he first noted that the tenth amend-
ment, as amplified in National League of Cities, was inapplicable to municipalities because
the fourteenth amendment — which overrides the tenth — was at issues' The same
reasoning would have been sufficient to answer any eleventh-amendment objections if
section 1983 is viewed, as it should be, as a statute enacted pursuant to the fourteenth
" Id. at 664-83. As noted, the Sherman amendment would have made municipalities liable for
injuries inflicted by private persons.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 683. Justice Brennan also stated that this conclusion is compelled, id. at 690, and beyond
doubt. Id. at 700.
"Id. at 683-86.
58 Id. at 686-87.
" Id. at 688 (quoting Dictionary Act of Feb. 25, ch. 71,1871, 2,16 Stat. 431 (1871)).
65 See generally id. at 714-24 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 719-20 (Rehnquist, j., dissenting).
62 E.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,663 (1974).
63 Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.54.
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amendment. justice Brennan, however, dismissed the eleventh amendment on the some-
what simpler ground that municipalities enjoy no protection under that provision because
they "are not considered part of the State for eleventh amendment purposes."" It is not
surprising to find Justice Brennan giving an eleventh-amendment argument short shrift
in view of his frequently voiced hostility to any broad application of that constitutional
provision." Somewhat more surprising are the views of Justice Powell, who concurred
in the Monet! result. He has been one of the eleventh amendment's principal champions."
In Monell, however, he described as "odd" a result which would permit suits against local
government employees while the entities themselves remained exempt from liability."'
Yet the court's eleventh amendment decisions produce this very result in damages suits
where conduct of state employees is at issue."
In Monet! and elsewhere," the Burger Court has perpetuated prior doctrine that
cities enjoy no eleventh-amendment protection. Indeed, one of the uncertainties of
Burger Court federalism is the status of sub-national units within the federal system.'°
In National League of Cities, the Court extended the protection of state sovereignty to
local units of government." One might expect that municipalities would enjoy the same
protection in the more specific context of the eleventh amendment. It can certainly be
argued that the same symbolic considerations, such as protecting a unit of the state from
the affront of being haled before a federal tribunal,'" are at work regardless of whether
the defendant is labelled "state" or "municipal." In addition, including municipalities
within the ambit of the eleventh amendment would further the general federalistic goal
of unfettered state discretion in choosing the structure for delivery of government
services and would prevent federal courts from restricting the provision of services
through damages awards against the public treasury,'" a specific goal of eleventh amend-
ment doctrine. In this respect, it matters little whether one views cities as operating as
simply an arm of the state, or exercising a form of sovereignty which they have been
delegated by the state.
If in interpreting section 1983 the Court is in fact exercising a common law function,
the principles of federalism might also lead to immunity for municipalities. This is, in
" Id.
0 See, e.g., Green v. Mansour, 106 S. Ct. 423, 429 (1985) (Brennan, )., dissenting); Atascadero,
105 S. Ct. at 3150 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 125-26 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting).
" E.g., Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 3147-50; Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 97.
67 Monett, 436 U.S. at 705 (Powell, J., concurring).
"8 The states cannot be sued for damages, at least in federal court, because of the eleventh
amendment. However, the principle of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), permits injunctive relief
against state employees even if sued in their official capacity. The employees are, of course, liable
to suit in their individual capacity.
6" Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 718 (1973).
'" Cf. Lee, The Federal Courts and the Status of Municipalities: A Conceptual Challenge, 62 B.U.L.
REV. 1 (1982). The Court has been called upon to adjudicate the rights and duties of municipalities
in various legal contexts. Yet there is no clear pattern to the Court's holdings; decisions have
variously increased and restricted the scope of federal power over municipalities. Consequently, the
case law regarding the rights and duties of sub-national units is in a state of confusion.
7, National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845.
7"See Brown, supra note 4, at 371. •
" Note, The Denial of Eleventh Amendment Immunity to Political Subdivisions of the States: An Unfits-
ithed Strain on Federalism, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1042, 1062 f 1979).
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effect, what has happened with states, even though the word "person" in section 1983
would seem equally applicable to states." (Any doctrinal problems which flow from
allowing the section 1983 entity action to be brought in state, as opposed to federal,
court are equally present in both cases.") Indeed, a striking paradox of Burger Court
federalism is that cities have been treated as hierarchically equivalent to states in section
1983 equitable actions. In Rizzo v. Goode, 76 for example, plaintiffs had sought equitable
relief against the practices of a municipal police department. The Court, per Justice
Rehnquist, invoked principles of comity and federalism in cautioning against federal
judicial interference with what it termed "state" executive functions." In Rizzo and other
equitable cases," the principles of federalism work to the municipalities' benefit and
against the language of section 1983. This approach has strong similarities to that found
in eleventh-amendment cases in which the amendment's clear language is subordinated
to considerations of state sovereignty." The eleventh amendment comes into play, how-
ever, primarily in the context of damages actions. Protection of the public fist lies at the
heart of eleventh-amendment jurisprudence. It is suprising that this concern seems
absent from the development of section 1983 actions against municipalities.
Suppose the Court had embarked down this public fist road. Where might it have
come out? There are arguments in favor of municipal immunity. To begin with, there
is the unquestioned fact that many units of local government are not in a strong financial
position." Thus, an award of damages against the local treasury may place serious
obstacles in the way of provision of basic local services and may even raise the spectre
of bankruptcy. In congressional consideration of a possible alteration of the Monell ruling,
municipal advocates have repeatedly raised these public fist arguments and treated the
relevant committee to a veritable parade of horribles. 8 ' It may be that these arguments
are substantially overstated. For example, in describing the threat posed by section 1983
suits, critics tend to cite the amounts claimed in plaintiffs' complaints rather than those
actually awarded in judgments or settlements. 82 Nonetheless, the existence of urban fiscal
stress (and perhaps rural as well) seems to be sufficiently accepted that arguments based
on it might lead toward immunity.
Of course, there are very strong principles drawn from the law of torts which cut
in the other direction. The most obvious are the desire to compensate the victim of
wrongdoing and notions of spreading the loss over the components of the broad entity
74 See Quern, 440 U.S. at 350-51 (Brennan, J., concurring).
95 If a state is not a "person" as that term is used in section 1983, it is hard to see precisely how
section 1983 actions can be brought against states in state courts any more than in federal court.
Of course, the analysis in Quern focuses on whether Congress in enacting section 1983 intended to
withdraw the states' traditional eleventh amendment immunity. Id. at 342-45. This immunity applies
only to suits in federal court. Nonetheless, Quern appears to hold that states are not "persons" under
section 1983. See id. at 342-43; id. at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
n Id. at 379-80.
79 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,112 (1983).
79 See generally Brown, supra note 4, at 366-72. Just as the eleventh amendment is one mani-
festation of concern for state sovereignty, so the "principles of federalism" are another.
80 See, e.g., Owen, 445 U.S. at 670 (Powell, J., dissenting).
" See generally Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. 1983: Hearings on S. 584, S. 585, and S. 990
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
" Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 530 n.212.
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which may fairly be said to have caused the loss.83 These considerations argue strongly
in favor of municipal liability. Arguments based on compensation fit squarely within the
underlying purposes of section 1983. The case for municipal liability is buttressed by
the fact that the growth of immunity defenses for individual officials might leave the
section 1983 plaintiff remediless.
Thus, there is much to be said for Mondry rejection of municipal immunity even
after injecting and weighing the policy arguments in the other direction. Yet these policy
arguments are by no means dead. They are an important consideration in efforts to
limit the liability established by Monell and may even have played a role in Monell itself.
C. Why Not Respondeat Superior?
Having gone so far as to find municipalities liable under the statute, it would not
have been surprising for a nationalist oriented Court to take the additional step of
establishing respondeat.superior as the principle under which liability would be determined
in a particular case. Yet Monell, written by justice Brennan, specifically rejected respondeat
superior and purported to reject as well any policy-based construction of section 1983
which would have led to vicarious liability." The Court's analysis rested on the language
of the statute and the legislative history. As to the former, Justice Brennan emphasized
the words, "shall subject, or cause to be subjected ...."85 He viewed these verbs as
emphasizing the importance of a direct relationship between the defendant and the
victim. To remain faithful to the language, it would be necessary that the municipality's
involvement be direct, as opposed to indirect solely through the employment of the
person who committed the wrong." As for the legislative history, the Court again viewed
Congress's rejection of the Sherman amendment as shedding light on broader issues of
the statute's scope. The amendment itself represented a type of vicarious liability, and
from Congress's refusal to incorporate this particular form, justice Brennan drew "the
inference that Congress did not intend to impose such liability" in any form." He
recognized that basic principles of tort law are frequently invoked to justify respondeat
superior: notably, the possibility of reduction of accidents through deterrence and the
desirability of spreading costs among the community as a whole. 88 Justice Brennan,
however, viewed these arguments as similar to those put forward in favor of the amend-
ment." The entire tone of justice Brennan's analysis suggests that these policy arguments
for imposing liability under respondeat superior theory might have their place in elabora-
tion of tort liability by a common law court but that they are not to be considered by a
federal court in the narrower exercise of construing section 1983.
Having decided that respondeat superior is not the proper standard for municipal
liability, the Monell Court stated that "it is when execution of a government's policy or
custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be
said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is
83 See, e.g., Owen, 445 U.S. at 657.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
" Id. at 691 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
t"' Id. at 692.
" Id. at 693 n.57.
"M. at 693-94.
Id. at 694.
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responsible under § 1983: 90 The Court left for "another day" amplification of what was
meant by official policy. 9 ' Although the justices have struggled with attempts to carry
out this task, they continue to insist that the basic choice of official policy over respondeat
superior is one that "tracks the language of the statute: 92
Commentators have been exceptionally sharp in criticizing the Court's rejection of
respondeat superior. Several themes stand out. The first is that the language of section
1983 is hardly as clear as the Court would have one believe. In particular, the word
"cause" is a somewhat vague term which contains room for a broad range of meaning."
Not only is the notion of causation an invitation for flexible analysis; it takes on a
particularly policy-oriented content when coupled with the notion of respondeat superior.
Both are concepts aimed at the proper allocation of costs and risks. In the context of
section 1983, one can easily argue that a respondeat superior analysis permits the conclusion
that the municipality can be sued for having indirectly "caused" the defendant to be
subjected to a violation in any situation in which the municipal employee was within the
general scope of his or her authority." Alternatively, one might view the municipality as
having acted directly through the wrongdoing employee, thus satisfying notions of direct
causation." The general point is that the doctrine was well-established at common law
and that having decided that Congress meant to treat municipalities as persons, the
Court's exclusion of respondeat superior is a surprising exercise in statutory construction.
The critics have also made short shrift of arguments that municipalities could not
be liable under theories of respondeat superior based on the 1871 Congress's refusal to
adopt the Sherman amendment. It may be that Congress simply was not focusing upon
municipal liability of a respondeat superior nature when it considered the amendment.%
The main argument put forth by the critics is one which would seem to have appeal to
Justice Brennan: the Sherman amendment represented a form of municipal liability so
different from respondeat superior liability that it is misguided to infer anything about the
latter from the rejection of the -former.% Justice Brennan himself refused to see in
Congress's action taken on the Sherman amendment what Justice Rehnquist was willing
to see — a general rejection of municipal liability. 98 The critics, therefore, surely have a
point in questioning the majority's conclusion that the rejection of the Sherman amend-
ment constituted a rejection of respondeat superior municipal liability.
Once the broader issues are viewed as properly open to consideration, the critics
have had a field day in pointing out that the policy considerations underlying section
1983 would be furthered by adoption of a respondeat superior approach. Among the
obvious and frequently mentioned rationales are those of compensating the victim in
line with the remedial purposes of the statute," spreading the loss equitably to the
99 Id.
91 Id. at 694-95.
92 Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. at 2433.
"See Blum, supra note 47, at 409,412, n.14; Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 505 n.99.
94 Note, Section 1983 Municipal Liability and the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior, 46 U. Cu,. L. REV.
935,939,941 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Section 1983].
95 Id. at 940.
11€ Blum, supra note 47, at 413 n.15.
97 E.g., Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 516; Note, Section 1983, supra note 94, at 942-47.
99 Martell, 436 U.S. at 722-23 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
9" Note, Section 1983, supra note 94, at 953-54.
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deeper pocket of the community,wo and deterring official misconduct through encour-
aging more careful supervision and training of municipal employees. 10 ' Thus, the ar-
guments which the Monett Court refused to consider and which support a respondent
superior approach play a major role in the critique of that decision by those who feel that
the question was an open one.
The Court's decision in Owen v. City of Independence,w2 handed down two years after
Munch, in 1980, gave the unmistakable impression that a majority of the Court, including
Justice Brennan, had gotten the message. The principal issue in Owen was whether a
municipality could invoke a good faith immunity in circumstances when such a defense
would be available to the officers whose conduct had injured the plaintiff4°' The Court
held that it could not, utilizing an analysis whose tones seem much closer to those of
Monell's critics than to those of the decision itself. The Owen majority invoked both "the
legislative purpose in enacting the statute and ... considerations of public policy." 104
Compensation of those wronged was seen as the principal aim of the statute, and
therefore it would be particularly unjust if the government itself could escape liability.
As Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, put it,
Nt hardly seems unjust to require a municipal defendant which has violated
a citizen's constitutional rights to compensate him for the injury suffered
thereby. Indeed, Congress enacted § 1983 precisely to provide a remedy for
such abuses of official power .... Elemental notions of fairness dictate that
one who causes a loss should bear the loss. 05
The opinion also states that deterrence would be furthered by denying any good faith
immunity to municipalities in the Owen context.w6 Although the precise words respondent
superior are not present in the opinion, because in Owen the majority reasoned that
official policy of the municipality had caused the plaintiff's injury, it is hard not to hear
strong echoes of the general tort doctrines supporting that theory in the statement
quoted above. Those doctrines can also be seen in the Court's further observation that
"it is the public at large which enjoys the benefits of the government's activities, and it
is the public at large which is ultimately responsible for its administration."m Justice
Brennan summed up his result as recognizing the evolution of doctrines of tort law
toward equitable loss-spreading as a co-equal factor with fault and viewed this result as
a proper approach to allocation of the costs attendant upon constitutional violations,ws
despite Justice Powell's contention, in dissent, that the approach places a heavy financial
burden on "the level of government least able to bear it."w 9 The Owen Court seemed
not only to be embracing a policy-orientated approach to section 1983 — in particular,
""' Note, Monell v. Department of Social Services: One Step Forward and a Half Step Back for
Municipal Liability Under Section 1983, 7 Hors -rga L. REV. 893, 919 (1979) [hereinafter Note, One
Step Forward].
un Note, Section 1983, supra note 94, at 954.
1 °2 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
103 1d. at 624-25.
"Id. at 650.
1 "5 Id. at 654.
w" Id. at 651.
1 "7 Id. at 655 (emphasis added).
"Id. at 657.
"'Id. at 670 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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policies associated with tort law — but also to be heading toward the inevitable conclusion
that those policies would, in a proper case, mean respondeat superior.
Despite the Owen Court's seeming adoption of the Monett critics' views, the Court
has not adopted respondent superior and, indeed, seems to have pulled back From the logic
of Owen read broadly. For example, in 1981, in City of Newport a Fact Concerts, Inc.,"°
the Court confronted the issue of whether punitive damages were available against a
municipality whose official policy had violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. The
Court ruled that no such damages could be awarded, engaging in an analysis that at
times seems close to justice Powell's dissent in the Owen case.'" justice Blackmun, writing
for the majority in Fact Concerts, trotted out the rejection of the Sherman amendment
as evidence both that Congress was concerned with financial burdens on local govern-
ments, and also that it did not want "innocent taxpayers ... unfairly punished for the
deeds of persons over whom they had neither knowledge nor control."" 2 The taxpayers
in Owen may well have had knowledge and control, at least imputed through the concept
of official policy, but it would seem equally unfair to punish taxpayers in that context if
the relevant officials acted in a blameless fashion. Perhaps Owen and Fact Concerts are
not inconsistent. The Court certainly thought the decisions were consistent, emphasizing
in the latter case the deterrence and compensatory effects of the damages which would
be assessed against the municipality. 13 Neither cl&ision is directly on point when it comes
to the issue of respondeat superior. As for that question, the Court has insisted since Owen
and Fact Concerts that the Monett result was correct and that the task now is to flesh out
the meaning of the concept of official policy. The only justice to dissent on this issue is
Justice Stevens. 14
Not all of the arguments put forth in favor of respondent superior by Justice Stevens
and the critics are overwhelmingly convincing. For example, it seems difficult, despite
their insistence, 15 to draw any clear conclusion from the status of municipal tort liability
in 1871. This is, in any event, a matter over which the Court is hopelessly divided. Justice
Powell has described section 1983 as enacted against a "background of imtnunity," 16
while Justice Blackmun has indicated that at the time municipalities were "subject to suit
for a wide range of tortious activity."'" Perhaps the historical argument is essentially a
matter of emphasis, to the point that one can find in the common law background
support for either conclusion." 8 To the extent, however, that the Court is willing to
recognize the general pertinence of common law principles, which develop and change,
to section 1983 adjudication, this willingness would lead to a receptive view of respondent
superior. If the Court were once again to plunge as deeply into the waters of contemporary
tort theory as it did in Owen, the same undertaking would almost certainly lead to a
repudiation of Monett on this point. ,
10 453 U.S. '247 (1981).
"' See itl. at 266-70; Owen, 445 U.S. at 671-75 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"2 Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 266.
13 Id. at 266-69.
14 See Penthaur, 106 S. Ct. at 1303 (Stevens, J., concurring); Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. at 2441 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. at 2442 & n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"6 Owen, 445 U.S. at 679 n.18 (Powell, J., dissenting).
12 Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 259.
18 See, e.g., Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. at 2434 n.5.
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Perhaps there is a substantial degree of policy oriented analysis lurking in the Monell
Court's rejection of the respondeat superior approach. The relevant policies, however, are
those of comity and federalism. What is worth pondering is whether the principles of
federalism, as articulated in the Younger line of cases and similar decisions, may not have
made a sub-silentio reappearance in the respondeat superior portion of Monell, after being
seemingly ignored in the basic decision to hold municipalities liable. In particular, it is
worth noting that the Monell Court drew on the Sherman amendment's history as
justification for a limiting approach to municipal liability under section 1983. 112 Yet such
an approach flies in the face of much of what preceded it in the Monell opinion itself
where the Court "unequivocally" concluded that municipalities were included in the
statute's reference to any person. It may be that the Court was indeed concerned with
the impact of section 1983 lawsuits on municipal treasuries and eschewed loss-spreading
arguments precisely because those who would bear the loss would ultimately be the
taxpayers, particularly in their ability to receive the desired level of municipal services.
There is thus a striking ambiguity about ManeII, an ambiguity which makes sense if one
accepts the view that federalism concerns drove the Court to seek a limited form of
municipal liability every bit as much as nationalist concerns drove it to establish that
liability in the first place. The pivotal question then becomes whether official policy, the
operative concept which the Court adopted in lieu of respondeat superior, will perform a
limiting function without going so far as to swallow up the liability which spawned it
initially. The recent struggles to give content to the concept shed light on this question,
as does a closer look at the arguments in favor of its adoption — as opposed to those
which simply lead to rejecting the polar alternatives of respondeat superior or municipal
immunity.
D. Official Policy — A Doctrine Derived from a Process of Elimination?
The Court's opinion in Monell offers substantial justification for rejecting both
municipal immunity and respondeat superior, but relatively little support for adopting
official policy as the operative concept for determining municipal liability. Justice Bren-
nan may have thought the conclusion was obvious — "compel[led]" by the language and
legislative history,'" as he stated — or the Court may have settled on official policy by a
process of elimination. Neither of the polar alternatives was acceptable; thus, the answer
was to be found somewhere in between at a rather nebulous point to be clarified later.
While this reading is tempting, Monell and subsequent cases do offer some guidance as
to the reason for adopting official policy.
One theme is that of directness: a municipality should be liable only for its own acts,
not those of others, even municipal employees. Perhaps the legislative history — the
rejection of the Sherman amendment — provides more support for this notion than
does the statutory language. Rejection of vicarious liability can imply an acceptance of
direct liability, 121 while "causes to be subjected" does not necessarily point one way or
the other. Justice Rehnquist has, in fact, explained this aspect of Monell as guided
primarily by the legislative history. 122
19 See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
199 Monet!, 436 U.S. at 690,691.
121 Cf. Levin, The Section 1983 Municipal Immunity Doctrine, 65 GEO. L.J.1483,1523-24 (1977).
127 Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. at 2433.
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Of course, municipal corporations are like other artificial persons in that they can
act only through agents. Implicit in the concept of official policy is a distinction between
policymaking "agents" and those of lower rank. The taxpayers should be liable only for
the choices of those in the former category because their policy decisions can be imputed
more directly to the taxpayers who "chose" them. Holding a municipality liable for, say,
an unconstitutional ordinance thus is substantially different from holding* (and the
taxpayers) liable for such costs and risks of government as errant policemen. The latter
is vicarious liability, the former is direct. Line drawing is inescapable. Ordinances gen-
erally are not adopted by referendum, for example; even here, there is an element of
vicariousness. Still, one can see what the Court is driving at.
A second theme is that of fault. The Monet! opinion only used the word "fault"
twice, somewhat in passing.'" The subsequent case of Tuttle, however, recast Monet! as
establishing a fault-based approach to municipal liability under section 1983. 12 '1 What
the Court means by fault is not yet clear. It may be only a means of restating the
directness requirement. Fault-based liability is the opposite of vicarious liability. But the
Court may be reaching for something more through the use of fault, in particular, for
notions of culpability. The municipality must have done something which is wrong in
some sense. Adoption of an unconstitutional policy is one example of a wrong act, even
if, under Owen, there was no bad faith. State of mind may come into play, however, if
the municipality acts deliberately in a manner which, although not itself unconstitutional,
causes a constitutional violation. As analysis of Tuttle will demonstrate, developing the
concept of fault is likely to prove difficult for the Court. 125
A point in favor of the concept of official policy is that redressing unlawful core
conduct by government entities is one of the principal roles of the civil rights litigation
which section 1983 exemplifies. 12€ One perceptive pre-Month commentator drew a dis-
tinction between "political cases" and "constitutional tort cases."' 27 He defined political
cases as "those in which a plaintiff sues a state or local government, alleging that its
policies, usually embodied in statutes or regulations, are unconstitutional."' 28 Municipal
liability in the political cases not only would be faithful to the goals of civil rights litigation;
it would be essential because the individual defendants would enjoy some form of
immunity thus potentially leaving the claimants remediless. 129 In contrast, in the consti-
tutional tort cases, such as Monroe, involving individual abuse of power, the individual
defendant would be liable while the municipality would be immune. The Monell Court
appears to have agreed with this analysis.
Thus, there are arguments in favor of official policy as the operative concept of
municipal liability. Beyond any intrinsic merit, however, is the underlying desire of the
Court, or at least some of its members, to limit the liability established in Monett Justice
Rehnquist, in particular, has suggested a need to develop official policy in a manner
which makes these limits effective.n° It is in this search for limits that the principles of
' 23 Monell, 436 U.S. at 681 n.40, 692 n.57.
In See generally Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. at 2434; id. at 2440 (Brennan, J., concurring).
125 See infra text accompanying notes 166-69.
126 Levin, supra note 121, at 1519.
In Id. at 1487.
128 Id. (emphasis added).
122 Id. at 1536-37.
, s° Tuttle, 1 05 S. Ct. at 2436. See also id. at 2434 n.5 (discussing Monell as a case limiting municipal
liability).
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federalism emerge as a powerful force. Governments are treated differently from cor-
porations in applying the do'ctrine of respondeat superior because, in the American federal
system, they occupy a distinct position."' Concern for the public fist is present also."'
The municipal treasury is reachable (putting aside possible indemnification in individual
officer suits) only when core conduct of the municipality itself is at issue.
Yet the official policy concept has, merit apart, an obvious Achilles' heel: workability.
Its contours may be more than elusive; they may be incapable of ascertainment. Questions
such as who are policymakers, when and how do policymakers make policy, and whether
the policy itself must be unconstitutional to impose liability are proving extemely difficult
for the Supreme Court and lower courts. Something more than the inevitable fleshing
out of a new concept may be involved. Close examination of the Supreme Court's post-
Monet/ decisions on the question leads to the conclusion that despite surface agreement
over official policy as the operative concept, there is still fundamental disagreement over
whether the concept is to perform a limiting function or whether any distinction between
"political cases" and "constitutional torts" will be blurred to the point of obliteration. For
the federalistic block, the search for limits is dominant. For the nationalists, "Monell is a
case about responsibility and the concept of official policy need not operate to
defeat liability.
II. THE ELUSIVE CONTOURS OF OFFICIAL POLICY — TOWARDS A LIMITING OR A BROAD
DEFINITION?
A. Tuttle and the Problem of Linking Single Acts to Official Policy
Seven years after Monell, in 1985, the Court took its first "small but necessary step"
toward clarifying official policy."' City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle 135 presented one of the
classic issues which the official policy concept will pose: when the only direct violation
of constitutional rights is the act of a nonpolicymaking municipal employee, what conduct
by policymakers must be shown in order to link the municipality itself to the violation?
Tuttle involved the fatal shooting of plaintiff's husband by a police officer who had
been on the city's force for ten months." 8 The evidence raised substantial questions
about the officer's claim that his use of deadly force was justified given the threat to his
life from a possible robber."' Plaintiff's case against the city was based on the theory
that a policy of inadequate police training had caused the officer's actions." 8 As proof
of this policy, she introduced expert testimony on the force's training, testimony by the
officer concerning his training, and facts about the incident itself."" The trial judge's
instructions appeared to permit the jury to infer the existence of a policy of inadequate
"' Levin, supra note 121, at 1534 n.199.
' 32 See, e.g., Owen, 445 U.S. at 665 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also Note, One Step Forward, supra
note 100, at 919; Note, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983 for Civil Rights Violations After Monell,
64 Iowa L. REV. 1032,1048-49 (1979).
133 Pembaur, 106 S. Ct. at 1297 (emphasis added).
' 34 Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. at 2429.
135 105 S. Ct. 2427 (1985).
' 33 Id. at 2429-30.
137 Id. at 2430.
'" Id.
' SY Id.
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training solely from the fact that the incident occurred."' The Supreme Court reversed
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit's decision upholding a verdict against the
city."
Justice Rehnquist wrote for a plurality of four." He first focused on the relationship
of the instruction to plaintiff's theory of inadequate training. He noted that the plaintiff
did not argue that the city had a policy which authorized the use of excessive force, but
that its training and supervision were so lax that such incidents would occur."' This
raised the issue of what evidence concerning training (and supervision) was before the
jury. Justice Rehnquist rejected the plaintiff's claim that she had introduced sufficient
evidence by focusing on the instruction. Under it the jury could have disbelieved all
testimony concerning training except the fact that the shooting occurred and still found
the municipality liable for its policy.' Such an inference would be an incorrect appli-
cation of Monell and the concept of official policy because it would permit "the imposition
of municipal liability under circumstances where no wrong could be ascribed to municipal
decisionmakers."" 5 In other words, plaintiff's trial counsel had secured too favorable an
instruction.
One might have expected Justice Rehnquist to leave matters there. He proceeded,
however, to an apparent alternate holding based on plaintiff's contention that Monell
permits a finding of official policy based on a single decision with a single victim.'" In
addressing this argument, Justice Rehnquist distinguished Monell by noting that the
policy at issue there "in and of itself violated the constitutional rights . . ." of the
plaintiffs." No such claim could be made for the policy asserted in Tuttle. Justice
Rehnquist argued that some kind of policy can always be found and connected to an
alleged deprivation. In Tuttle, for example, the city had a "policy" of maintaining a police
force."' Thus, Justice Rehnquist observed, the plaintiff's broad reading of Monell raised
the issue of constitutional violations tied to not-unconstitutional policies."
Before reaching the issue of constitutional violations tied to not-unconstitutional
policies, Justice Rehnquist suggested a narrow definition of policy, based on state-of-
mind elements. Policy implies "a course of action consciously chosen from among various
alternatives." 15° Requiring a conscious decision would seem to rule out the possibility
that negligent training can amount to policy. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist raised the ques-
tion whether even gross negligence would be enough."
148 See id. at 2430-31.
"' Tuttle v. City of Oklahoma City, 728 F.2d 456 (10th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2427 (1985).
' 42 Justice Rehnquist was joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice White, and Justice O'Connor.
Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. at 2429. Justice Powell did not participate. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Id. at 2437 (Brennan, J., concurring).
See infra text accompanying notes 154-65. Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that respondent
superior should be the applicable standard. Id. at 2441-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" 5 Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. at 2434.
144 Id. at 2435.
14, Id.
148 Id. at 2435-37.
148 Id. at 2435. Monell is also distinguishable because there was no dispute in Monell that the
policy concerning medical leaves by pregnant employees had been adopted by the city. See, e.g., id.
at 2441 (Brennan, J., concurring).
148 Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. at 2436.
148 Id.
1,0 Id.
151 Id. at 2436 n.7.
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As to policies not in themselves unconstitutional, Justice Rehnquist's treatment of
the issue raises doubts as to whether he would ever find liability under such circum-
stances. 152 At the very least, he argued, plaintiffs in not-unconstitutional policy cases
must prove more than a "single incident ... to establish both the requisite fault on the
part of the municipality, and the causal connection between the 'policy' and the consti-
tutional deprivation." 153 Just what the plaintiff is to prove more of is not clear from
Justice Rehnquist's opinion. As for Tuttle itself, the defective instruction removed the
need for any further analysis of the issue of liability in a not-unconstitutional policy case
because the instruction in Tuttle would have permitted a finding of liability without proof
of anything beyond the incident.
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, for himself and Justices Blackmun and Mar-
shall, accepts much of Justice Rehnquist's analysis as well as his result.'" Because the
jury could have found the city liable solely on the basis of what one officer did on one
occasion, the trial judge's instruction would have improperly allowed circumvention of
Monell's rejection of respondeat superior.' 55 He reiterated Monell's emphasis on causation,
an inquiry required by the statute."5 Justice Brennan noted that the predicate to a
finding of causation is that the city itself acted."' Yet, he concluded, the instruction
could have led the jury to disregard any evidence about what municipal policymakers
did or did not do.' 58
Justice Brennan disagreed with the plurality over the issue of policies not in them-
selves unconstitutional. In part he felt that that question need not be reached."° As
Justice Brennan noted, the instruction's defect was the possibility that the municipal
policy, whatever its nature, would not be a factor in the jury's verdict.'" Thus, Justice
Brennan concluded that by reaching the issue of constitutional violations tied to not-
unconstitutional policies, the plurality had only complicated a matter which was simple,
at least in this case."'
While Justice Brennan felt the question should not be reached, he made it clear
where he stood with respect to the issue of the nature of the policy: it makes no difference
whether the municipal policy alleged is unconstitutional or not.'" He noted that the first
two elements of a section 1983 action were satisfied in Tuttle because a city is a "person"
for purposes of section 1983 and its police training procedures are actions "under color
of state law."'" Justice Brennan further noted that the plaintiff would also have to show
that the policy in question caused deprivation of a constitutional right, but stated that
the nature of the policy would not be determinative on this point.'" Indeed, Justice
' 52 Justice Rehnquist argued that some limitation must be placed on establishing municipal
liability through policies that are not themselves unconstitutional, or the test set out in Monett will
become a dead letter." Id. at 2436.
Id. (citations omitted).
154 ft at 2437 (Brennan, J., concurring).
155 Id. at 2440.
' 56 Id. at 2439-40.
' 51 Id. at 2439.
15'Id. at 2440.
' 59 /d. at 2441 n.8.
16° Id. at 2441 n.7.
16'See id. at 2437.
' 62 Id. at 2441 n.8.
163 Id. at 2439.
1" Id. at 2441 n.8.
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Brennan dismissed as "metaphysical" any "distinction between policies that are them-
selves unconstitutional and those that cause constitutional violations." 165
Tuttle presents a paradigmatic official policy problem: the only municipal employee
whose actions were directed at the plaintiff was of nonpolicymaking rank. In the police
context, for example, there is a wide range of training policies which might be attributable
to a particular city. The gamut runs from sloppiness in hiring, training, and supervision
to an express authorization to use deadly force in unwarranted circumstances. Under
respondeat superior, the plaintiff would succeed if she showed that the employee was acting
within the scope of his authority. Under official policy, she must go further and show
some link between his action and actions or decisions of policymakers. In this respect,
Justice Brennan is right that, on its facts, Tuttle is an easy case. Under the instruction,
the jury could have ignored the relevant policymakers altogether and still found for
plaintiff. Tuttle does, however, raise broader issues.
Both Justices Rehnquist and Brennan agreed that the question of fault was present
in Tuttle. 166 They may even be in agreement on Justice Rehnquist's first suggested limit:
that policy implies a state of mind more or less equivalent to an express authorization
of the act complained 01' 67 Justice Brennan seemed to require policies that either
"authorized the ... act or those that did not authorize but nonetheless were the 'moving
force' ... or cause of the violation."'" He also quoted with approval the plurality's
reference to "conscious choices" as indicative of policy.'" A strict definition of policy can
be seen as satisfying both the directness and culpability aspects of fault. Conscious choice
of a course of conduct justifies holding the one who chose it liable for foreseeable results
without recourse to notions of vicariousness. There is an element of culpability also: the
entity knew or should have known that the constitutional violation would occur.
The above analysis blends consideration of the policy with its results. Justice Rehn-
quist may, as an alternative, wish to pursue a separate inquiry limited to the nature of
the policy. Perhaps notions of culpability require that the policy itself be unconstitutional
for the entity to be held liable at all. Thus he might distinguish between sloppy hiring
and express authorization to use deadly force in unwarranted circumstances because the
former, apart from whether it is a policy and apart from whether it caused plaintiff's
constitutional injury, is not a federally invalid way of governing. As an alternative to no
liability for not-unconstitutional policies, Justice Rehnquist may settle for the position
that such policies trigger more demanding standards of causation suggested by the term
"moving force."'" If this is so, he and Justice Brennan may not be far apart. Justice
Brennan dealt with the plurality's hypothetical of a "policy" of having a police force by
indicating that "but for" tort analysis is not enough in every case to establish liability,m
although he views lo]rdinary principles of causation"' 72 as sufficient. To the extent that
Justice Rehnquist would go beyond ordinary principles of causation in not-unconstitu-
tional policy cases, the inquiry might become quite complex. Would a sliding scale of
165 Id.
166 See id. at 2434; id. at 2440 (Brennan, J., concurring).
167 See Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. at 2439 n.4 (Brennan, J., concurring).
168 Id. at 2440 (citation omitted).
165 Id. at 2439 n.4.
1118 Id. at 2436 n.8.
0, Id. at 2441 n.9 (Brennan, J., concurring).
152 Id.
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proof be necessary depending on how close to being unconstitutional the policy was, for
example, and what would be the variables?
The Court will soon have an opportunity to clarify the issues opened up by Tuttle.'"
At the very least, it seems Justice Rehnquist has identified problems that are lurking
beneath the surface. Whether factors such as the nature of the policy and the policy-
maker's state of mind can be enlisted in his effort to use official policy as a limiting
concept remains to be seen. The Tuttle problem of finding a link between what the
municipality did and the ultimate constitutional violation when the policymaker has not
acted vis a vis the plaintiff or the plaintiff's situation would seem inherently more difficult
than finding that same link in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,'" where a policymaker had
acted. Yet Pembaur produced five opinions and perhaps as many approaches.
B. Pembaur and the Problem of Single Acts by Policymakers
Pembaur arose out of an attempt to serve capias writs upon the premises of a third
party against whom no search warrant or similar order had been obtained.'" The
capiases were directed at employees of a doctor. 176 He refused to let county deputy
sheriffs, later joined by city police officers, enter his clinic beyond the reception area.'"
Efforts to obtain guidance from higher level officials on how to deal with the situation
led ultimately to the county prosecutor.'" His instructions were to "go in and get" the
witnesses. 17" The police officers chopped down the door with an axe, and the deputy
sheriffs entered and searched the clinic.'" Asserting that the search and entry violated
his constitutional rights, the doctor commenced a section 1983 action against numerous
defendants, including the county. 1 e' The lower courts ruled against him on the county's
liability, finding that no county policy on the matter had existed.'" The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review the dismissal of the claim against the county.'"
In Pembaur, unlike Tuttle, there was a policymaker directly involved in the consti-
tutional violation. State law authorized the prosecutor to render legal "instructions" to
other county officials." Although the sheriff himself was not directly involved in the
Pembaur incident, he testified that it was standard practice to refer such matters to the
prosecutor. 185 The question in Pembaur was whether the prosecutor had made county policy
in issuing a single order directed at a particular set of circumstances. Writing for a
plurality of four, Justice Brennan answered the question in the affirmative, viewing the
"'The Court has granted certiorari in City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 106 S. Ct. 1374 (1986). Kibbe
involved a limn of single incident: a high speed chase, leading to an individual's death, in which
several officers participated. The case below is reported at 777 F.2d 801 (1st Cir. 1985).
' 74 106 S. Ct. 1292 (1986).
'" Id. at 1294.
17" Id.
1 " Id.
178 Id. at 1294-95.
" 9 /d. at 1295.
' 9° Id.
' 8 ' Id.
1"2 Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 746 F.2d 337, 341 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1292,
1301 (1986).
' 99 Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 1(15 S. Ct. 3475 (1985).
' 84 See Pembaur, 106 S. Ct. at 1301.
185 Id.
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matter as a rather straightforward application of Mane11. The doctrine of official policy,
he wrote, requires courts "to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees
. . . . "196 The opinion makes clear that a municipality acts through its policymakers, and
authority to make policy may be found at several levels.'" Policy can be of general
applicability or it can be made in the context of a one-time decision aimed at a particular
situation.'"" The crucial question for Justice Brennan was determining who policymakers
are. He defined them as decisionmakers with "final authority to establish municipal
action with respect to the action ordered."'" This question, Justice Brennan wrote,
should be answered by reference to state law.'" He concluded that on the facts of
Pembaur official policy could be found with "little difficulty .. .."" The county prose-
cutor had made a decision, and he had final authority under state law to instruct officers,
such as the deputy sheriffs, with respect to the legal aspects of their duties."
Both Justices White and O'Connor joined in the judgment and the finding of official
policy." There is, however, a subtle difference in their opinions, one which takes on
great importance given the fact that without both of them there would be no majority
as to the proper analysis of official policy in single incident cases such as Pembaur. Justice
White cited the admitted practice of the city to use force in such circumstances as an
indication of county policy on the matter." He also agreed with Justice Brennan that
the county prosecutor had authority to make policy, although he seemed to treat the
sheriff as having joined in the particular decision."' Justice White wrote separately to
emphasize that the entry in Pembaur was not at the time unlawful under existing Supreme
Court fourth amendment precedents.'" Assuming that it was county policy to act to the
full extent of its authority, Justice White stated that the then lawfulness of the forcible
entry made it possible for the officials involved to adopt that procedure as standard
policy. Had "controlling law," such as a Supreme Court holding, forbade the entry,
individual officials could not have done so.'" Because "the controlling law places limits
on their authority," Justice White reasoned, "they cannot be said to have the authority
to make contrary policy."" These reservations were not relevant to Pembaur; thus, Justice
White concurred in the Court's judgment and opinion.
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment but not in the opinion." Her own
opinion is somewhat puzzling. Like Justice White, she was willing to infer that the county's
policy paralleled the city's, given the apparent legality at the time of entry of the deputy
um Id. at 1298 (emphasis in original).
187 Id. at 1298-99.
"9 Id. at 1299.
19" Id. (citation omitted).
"" Id. at 1301.
191 /d. at 1300.
192 1d. at 1300-01.
", Id. at 1301 (White, )., concurring); id. at 1304 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Stevens
cast a sixth vote for reversal. He again advocated respondeal superior and rejected the entire inquiry
into official policy as improper. Id. at 131)3 (Stevens, J., concurring).
"4 1d. at 1301 (White, J., concurring).
199 See id. at 1302 ("in this case ... the sheriff and prosecutor chose a course that was not
forbidden by any applicable law ...").
' 99 /d. at 1301.
192 Id.
192 Id.
'99 /d. at 1304 (O'Connor, J concurring).
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sheriffs' and police officers' actions.'" She also viewed the actions taken as those of more
than one official, and apparently viewed this as a factor in determining the existence of
county policy."' She rejected, however, the majority's analysis as broader than necessary
to decide the case and potentially too broad for future cases.'"
It is hard to figure out from Justice O'Connor's opinion when the county prosecutor
would not be a policymaker with respect to the legality of arrest procedures. Her
reference to "standard operating procedure" 2" may suggest that the elected county
governing body knew of the practices and that this knowledge was relevant. She rejected
Justice Brennan's final authority test, although for reasons that are not clear. Justice
White's insistence on lawfulness as a variable, as well as the other factors noted, suggests
that he too wanted the inquiry to extend beyond the status of the decision maker. Both
Justice O'Connor and Justice White seem to have searched the record to ascertain the
presence of someone of policymaking rank besides the prosecutor and of something
beyond the one-time phone call in order to find official policy.
Justice Powell's dissent,?°' for himself, Chief Justice Burger, and Justice Rehnquist,
is quite explicit. He rejected the plurality's approach to ascertaining the existence of
policy as focusing on who acted rather than what they did. He found Justice Brennan's
reasoning inherently circular: "policy is what policymakers make, and policymakers are
those who have authority to make poIicy." 2° For Justice Powell, the inquiry should focus
on the nature of what was done and the process which led to 1(.206
One indication that policy has been made, wrote Justice Powell, is the formulation
of a rule of general applicability."' He reasoned that governments are properly held
responsible for generalized decisions about how to govern.'" Justice Powell went on to
state that one time decisions, as well as rules of general applicability, can also constitute
official policy.'" Whether a one time decision is official policy, he explained, depends
on the process which yielded that decision.") Where formal procedures involving "voting
by elected officials, prepared reports, extended deliberations, or official records" are
utilized in making the one time decision, Justice Powell would find that official policy
had been made.'" To him, the Belabour facts involved merely an "off-the-cuff answer to
a single question" 212 rather than a generalized rule about arrest procedures or the
product of any policymaking process. Because neither a rule of general applicability nor
a single decision resulting from formal procedures was present, Justice Powell viewed
the majority as holding the municipality liable for all decisions by policymakers within
the scope of their authority, whether the decisions were policy or not. 213 To him, this
result was tantamount to the respondeat superior liability which Month forbids. 2 "
266 1d.
20, Id.
2°2 Id.
263 Id.
20' Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
266 Id. at 1308.
"6 Id. at 1308-09.
2" Id. at 1309.
2°8 Id.
2" Id.
216 Id.
2" Id.
212 Id. at 1310.
213 /d. at 1308.
2" Id.
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Neither the Brennan nor the Powell approach commands a majority of the Court.
Each illustrates the problems of workability which are endemic to the official policy
concept. In applying the Brennan test, determining the locus of "final authority" will
inevitably pose difficulties. Apparently, final means binding unless appealed to someone
who has authority to reverse the decision. 2 ' 5 Justice Brennan recognized that policymak-
ing authority may be delegated."" Thus plaintiffs in particular cases will seek to identify
final authority further and further down the line of municipal command. The lower
courts will have to look to state and local law, which may be unclear. These problems,
while serious, will probably sort themselves out over time as a body of guiding precedent
is developed, assuming the plurality approach is followed.
Justice Powell's approach — it cannot really be called a test — might prove harder
to apply. It appears that the status of the decision maker is not relevant. Only the two
factors of generality and process are. How much generality is necessary to convert what
might be considered a one-time decision into a rule of general applicability? In the Tuttle
context, would the outcome have been different if the prosecutor had also issued an
"off-the-cuff" memo outlining what he had authorized and implying that it represented
arrest policy for future incidents? Alternatively, how much process would have sufficed
to turn the telephone response into a one-time decision constituting policy? Justice
Powell's opinion suggests that if some sort of deliberative action had preceded the
instructions — a staff meeting perhaps — the instructions would have constituted policy.
Given the flexibility of the criteria offered; especially in the "process" prong, it would
take the lower courts a long time to formulate a consistent approach to policy in the
context of a one-time decision by an official of policymaking rank." 7
On a more fundamental level is the question of which approach is most faithful to
Monell's endorsement of municipal liability coupled with its rejection of respondeat superior.
Justice Brennan can be criticized for failing to deal adequately with the problem of ad
hoc decisions by policymakers Within their sphere of authority. If the municipality is
liable for everything policymakers do within that sphere, justice Powell's equation of
this position with respondeat superior has merit. Justice Brennan chose to rely on definitions
of policy, leading to a battle of the dictionaries." 8 A better defense might be that the
municipality has chosen to put the particular official in a form of governing position.
That is quite different from merely "hiring a tortfeasor" and seems to reflect the core
conduct approach implicit in the concept of official policy. The policymaker can be
viewed as sufficiently part of the government itself that both the directness and culpability
aspects of fault are met.""
Justice Powell does, of course, recognize the possibility of ad hoc decisions and treats
them as different from policy. There is much to be said for focusing on generality and/
or process as the hallmarks of official policy for which a municipality is liable. These are
indications of governing — by definition the sort of activity for which governments
should be liable under a core conduct approach. 22° In addition, the municipality's posture
215 Cf. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 3119–
21 (1985) (defining final action).
216 Pembaur, 106 S. Ct. at 1300.
212 Predictability is somewhat aided by the fact that this is a federal law inquiry.
218 Compare Pembaur, 106 S. Ct. at 1299 n.9 (1981 Webster's dictionary defines policy as a
decision(s) to carry out a chosen course of action(s)) (Brennan, J.) with id. at 1309 (1979 Webster's
dictionary defines policy as a "governing principle [or] plan") (Powell, J., dissenting).
212 See supra text accompanying notes 121-25.
22" See supra text accompanying notes 126-32.
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is weakest when it has done what Justice Powell would require and still come out with
an unconstitutional policy. Liability is thus fully justified. But should the ad hoc cases
escape liability? Particularly troublesome is the spectre of a municipality which, for
whatever reason, eschews policy formulation and governs by ad ]othely. Could the county
prosecutor in Pembaur continue to give off-the-cuff advice in all such matters without
triggering county liability for unconstitutional advice? If the same advice was repeated,
Justice Powell would probably find evidence of a policy or custom sufficient to impose
liability. 221 But the proverbial first bite would go unredressed. The issue separating the
dissenters from the plurality is whether that first bite really came from the county or
the prosecutor.
Tuttle and Pembaur present quite different facets of the problem of giving context
to official policy as the operative concept for determining municipal liability. The former
poses the problem of linking policymakers to the victim of a constitutional deprivation
at the hands of nonpolicymakers who were the only municipal officials dealing specifically
with him. In Pembaur, in contrast, a policymaker dealt directly with the victim. 22 The
question is when do the policymaker's acts constitute policy. In both cases the Court was
virtually unanimous in invoking official policy as the relevant inquiry, while badly split
over how to apply it. Such splits are likely to continue. In part, this prediction is based
on the novelty and malleability of the official policy concept. Each of the major opinions
discussed above is a plausible interpretation and application of that concept. Beyond any
particular question, however, lies the recurring issue of Monett and the search for limits.
III. THE OFFICIAL POLICY DEBATE. IN THE CONTEXT OF BURGER COURT FEDERALISM —
A PROTRACTED CONFLICT?
The parameters of the debate over official policy seem clear. Those who adhere to
a nationalist position will attempt to turn it into a broad tool for finding liability. They
view section 1983 as a statute to be applied in sweeping fashion, given its central role in
vindicating national values through the federal courts. Justice Brennan's opinions in
Tuttle and Pembaur epitomize the nationalist approach to official policy. Those who adhere
to a federalistic approach seek to limit municipal liability while not precluding it. Behind
their emphasis on Monell's rejection of respondeat superior lie broader principles of fed-
eralism and a desire to harmonize section 1983 with those principles. Justice Rehnquist's
opinion in Tuttle reflects this approach.
An across the board victory for either side seems unlikely and unaffected by recent
changes in the Court's composition. The Burger Court has been sharply split over many
issues, including federalism. Its decisions on section 1983 do not fall into a consistent
pattern. In the context of official policy, the task of putting together a coherent majority
is even more difficult because we are dealing with a set of only eight justices. Justice
Stevens rejects the inquiry into official policy altogether. The positions of justices O'Con-
nor and White in Pembaur suggest the absence of any permanent majority such as that
which has preserved and strengthened the eleventh amendment despite repeated no-
"' See Pembaur, 106 S. Ct. at 1309 (Powell, J., dissenting).
222 Of course, nonpolicymakers were involved as well.
September 1986] 	 SECTION 1983	 907
tionalist assaults. 223 Still, it may be helpful to sketch some doctrinal factors which could
at least tilt the debate one way or the other.
The strongest point in favor of a nationalist approach is that Congress has spoken.
The nationalists would argue that the decision in Garcia represents broad acceptance of
the view that it is Congress, not the federal courts, which is charged with protecting the
interests of the states (and localities) within the national government. They would also
point out that the original debates over section 1983 can indeed be read as support for
the premise that Congress takes federalism concerns into account before it acts. Congress
subordinated those concerns to the goals of compensation and deterrence when it
enacted section 1983, a statute to be construed broadly. Finally any notions of state
sovereignty which spring from the eleventh amendment are not relevant because that
amendment does not protect municipalities. 224
Central to any federalistic rebuttal of these contentions is the position that Congress
spoke in a manner which authorized the courts to exercise broad latitude in giving
content to section 1983. Thus it may be true that the Burger Court's principles of
federalism are a judicial creation which must yield when Congress so directs. 225 The
Court, however, has not read section 1983 as containing such a directive. Indeed, many
of the seminal Burger Court cases elaborating principles of federalism involve restrictions
on section 1983. As the official policy debate unfolds, according to the federalistic view,
it is proper to develop the meaning of official policy with federalism principles in mind.
Given the highly intrusive nature of the section 1983 damages remedy, limiting it be-
comes important. That, for the federalists, is just what Mane11 did.
If the Court remains divided with no synthesis emerging, might Congress step in?
Justice Rehnquist invited it to do so in plumbing the difficulties of Tuttle. 22° There in
fact have been significant legislative attempts to respond to the Court's section 1983
decisions. In the 1970's, liberals upset with decisions on such issues as immunity and
intervention in state proceedings sought to overturn those decisions. 227 In the 1980's,
the impetus has come from conservatives who view the Court's decisions as too burden-
some on local government. 228 Neither attempt has prevailed. Part of the reason may be
that the Court trimmed its sails more than once, whether or not in response to these
initiatives. More importantly, it is doubtful that either side could win a legislative battle
to secure significant changes in the Court's section 1983 decisions. The forces opposed
to change in either direction could probably achieve a stand-off. A steamroller type
victory such as the Voting Rights Amendments of 1982 229 does not seem likely.
Another approach to the Court's sharp split in section 1983 decisions might be to
develop a consensus for legislative reform. The premise would be that continuing un-
229 The recent 5-4 decisions sustaining eleventh amendment defenses have all been joined by
Chief . Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. For a list of cases, see
supra note 65.
224 See supra text accompanying notes 62-65.
229 See Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of a Misguided
Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. REV. 84, 114, 117 (1985).
229 Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. at 2434 n.5.
227 See Howard, The Stales and the Supreme Court, 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 375. 382 (1982).
228 See Rader, Section 1983, The Civil Civil Rights Action: Legislative and Judicial Directions, 15
CUMB. L. REV. 571, 588-89 (1985).
229 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS (96 Stat.) 131.
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certainty over municipal liability benefits neither side. Municipalities need to plan their
financial affairs and, in particular, to know as much about potential liabilities as possi-
ble. 2" Would-be plaintiffs want to know where they stand. A possible trade-off would
be some version of respondeat superior liability"' in return for limits on damages and
attorneys fees. 232 Yet, the experience to date with legislative efforts to change section
1983 suggests that any such consensus bill is politically unlikely, apart from attendant
legal problems.
Assuming Congress will provide no further guidance, the development of official
policy is in the hands of the courts. Leaving the matter to the lower courts seems unwise
at this point. Widely varying decisions can be expected in an area — redress for consti-
tutional violations — where uniformity seems particularly desirable. The general issues
are known; it is time for the Supreme Court to step in and provide whatever guidance
it can. The Court apparently agrees. After allowing Monell to develop in the lower courts
for several years, it seems to have begun to use its certiorari discretion to address this
issue.233
The question which arises is whether the Court's intervention will achieve much. In
cases like Tuttle, where only nonpolicymakers cause the deprivation, a federalistic ma-
jority may prevail in insisting upon a substantial link between what the municipality did
and the ultimate constitutional violation. With Justice Powell participating, the Tuttle
plurality alternative holding could become the basis for further limitations on municipal
liability, with the lawfulness of the city's conduct an important variable. The outcome in
Pembaur situations is less certain. The direct involvement of a policymaker seems to make
a difference to five members of the Court, although there are not five justices for whom
it is enough. The final authority test"' cannot be viewed as accepted. Even if no majority
can be found for a formulation of official policy, plaintiffs will win their share of cases
given Justice Stevens' vote. Still, a federalistic majority might yet emerge here as well. 235
230 See, e.g., Blodget, Premium Hikes Stun Municipalities, 72 A.B.A. J. 48 ( July 1986) (lack of
predictable basis for determining municipal liability under section 1983 has led to unavailable or
extremely expensive liability insurance for municipal corporations).
23 ' See Blum, supra note 47, at 413 n.15.
222 See, e.g., Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. at 2447 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
233 decision in Kibbe v. City of Springfield, 777 F.2d 801 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S.
Ct. 1374 (1986), would mark the third straight term in which the Court handed down a decision
on official policy.
2" See supra text accompanying notes 215-16.
235 another, much commented on, test, see Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762 (5th Cir.
1984) (initial rehearing en bane) aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 739 F.2d 993 (second hearing en bane),
and relevant commentary. E.g., Note, Bennett v. City of Slidell: New Guidelines for Municipal Liability
for Civil Rights Violations, 1984 DET. C.L. REV. 959 (1984); Note, Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983: Bennett v. City of Slidell, 45 LA. L. REV. 1085 (1985). In Bennett, a divided fifth circuit,
sitting en bane, articulated a stricter standard for determining when official municipal policy has
been created by a policy-making official.
The governing body must expressly or impliedly acknowledge that the agent or board
acts in lieu of the governing body to set goals and to structure and design the area of
the delegated responsibility, subject only to the power of the governing body to control
finances and to discharge or curtail the authority of the agent or board.
Bennett, 728 F.2d at 769. Bennett thus overruled the earlier broad standard of the fifth circuit that
had found official policy to be created whenever the acts or edicts were of a city official with final
authority for the relevant area of municipal activity. See, e.g., Schneider v. City of Atlanta, 628 F.2d
915 (5th Cir. 1980); Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1980).
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CONCLUSION
A hallmark of the Burger Court's overall judicial federalism238 has been resistance
to use of the federal courts to restructure sub-national institutions. 232 The centerpiece
of such litigation — as chronicled by Professor Chayes and others 238 — is the wide-
ranging injunctive decree. 239 The Court has perceived serious conflict between systemic
relief and principles of federalism.") It may be that the section 1983 damages action is
perceived as sufficiently different from the "public law" suite"' that this conflict is not
triggered. This would explain why municipalities are liable. Yet the effort to limit this
liability springs from the same source as efforts to limit injunctive relief. The very
existence of the official policy debate is a creature of Burger Court federalism. It seems
likely that the creator's imprint will ultimately push the concept in a restrictive direction.
"6 See generally Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism: Where We Are Now, 19 GA. L. Rev. 1075
(1985).
227 Chayes, supra note 22, at 45-56.
238 E.g., Chayes, supra note 22; Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715,
718-30 (1978).
"° See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 520 ("The injunction in its many forms was the sword
of the civil rights movement ....").
240 See generally Chayes, supra note 22.
271 The term is that of Professor Chayes. See id. at I.
